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Short sales, price pressure, and the stock price response to
convertible bond calls
Abstract
The announcement of a convertible bond call is associated with an average con-
temporaneous abnormal stock price decline of 1.75% and an ensuing price recovery in
the conversion period. A price fall and the subsequent recovery suggest price pressure
as the explanation for the announcement effect. However, in a perfect capital market
the option to convert is not exercised early and hence, the increase in the number of
shares outstanding does not occur at the announcement date. Instead, this paper ar-
gues and provides evidence that hedging-induced short selling is causing at least part
of the short-run price pressure.
Key words: Convertible bond calls; Hedging; Short selling; Price pressure; Underwriting
JEL Classification: G14; G24; G32
1 Introduction
The announcement of an ‘in-the-money’ convertible bond call is associated with an average contem-
poraneous abnormal stock price decline of 1.75% and an ensuing price recovery in the conversion
period. This paper argues and provides evidence that the decline in stock prices is due to investors’
short selling of the underlying stock at or around the call announcement. Two types of investors
have incentives to hedge their equity exposure by short selling at the time of the call. First, the
convertible hedge desks of investment banks try to lock in arbitrage profits by buying the called
convertible bond and short selling the underlying stock. Short selling is used to hedge the equity
risk of the convertible bond because the option to convert is not exercised immediately. Second, a
possible underwriter of the call also short sells in order to hedge the equity risk associated with the
call. The short selling of stock by these two types of investors, at least in part, causes the short-run
price pressure.
In order to provide evidence for such hedging, this paper contains the first analysis of short
selling around calls of convertible securities. More precisely, this paper examines the relationship
between short selling, trade volume, the predictability of the call, the stock price reaction to the
call announcement as well as variables related to hedging.
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This paper shows that the short selling of stock increases in anticipation of the call and that
during the conversion period, the number of shares sold short is more than three times higher
than after the call. On average, the total short selling involves at least 19% of the new shares to
be issued upon conversion, which corresponds to nearly 14 days of trading based on the average
trade volume before the call. In addition, the paper provides evidence of a large increase in the
trade volume at the announcement of the call, and shows that this trade volume is related to
the number of new shares to be issued upon conversion of the bonds. Such an increase in trade
volume, at least partly due to short selling, is likely to depress stock prices, thus causing the
short-run price pressure around convertible bond calls. Furthermore, the paper shows that short
selling is not solely caused by a possible underwriter. Finally, the paper shows that the relationship
between the announcement effect and several variables describing the call is also consistent with a
hedging-induced price pressure.
The case of convertible bond calls and the related findings are important for at least three
reasons. First, the arguments and findings presented in this paper close a gap in the existing
explanations for the negative announcement effect of convertible bond calls first documented by
Mikkelson (1981). Harris and Raviv (1985) provide a theoretical model that explains why the call
might work as a signal revealing bad news about a firm’s prospects. However, the empirical evidence
does not seem to support this bad-news explanation.1 Instead, Mazzeo and Moore (1992) document
a recovery of stock prices during the conversion period. Based on this and other tests, Mazzeo and
Moore argue that the announcement effect is due to price pressure caused by investors wanting to
sell the new stock received upon conversion of the bonds. A problem with this argument is that the
bonds are not converted at the time of the call announcement, and hence the new shares are not
issued until later. The fact that bondholders in general do not hold any of the underlying stocks,
shows that Mazzeo and Moore (1992) are missing an explanation about how the later increase in
the supply of shares is actually translated into price pressure at the time of the call announcement.
The present paper is the first to argue and provide evidence that the price pressure is caused by
the short selling of stock.
Second, the discovery of a short selling induced price pressure suggests the importance of liq-
uidity costs and is therefore related to the discussion of downward sloping short-run demand curves
1See for example Byrd and Moore (1996), Ederington et al. (1997), and Ederington and Goh (2001). Datta et
al. (2003) find positive short-run but negative long-run abnormal returns and thus provide some evidence for the
bad-news explanation.
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for stocks.2 Specifically, in this case the price pressure is found to be caused by the rarely examined
short selling of stock.
Third, the case of convertible bond calls provides insights into the behavior and investment
strategies of highly specialized investment banks. In particular, rather than hedging only systematic
risk, investment banks hedge on a deal by deal basis by short selling the underlying stock. Hence, the
results of this paper illustrate the importance of understanding investment strategies and behavior
by investment banks in order to explain short-run fluctuations in stock prices.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes calls of convertible
bonds and explains how short selling and hedging are related to the calls. Section 3 gives a short
description of the methodology and data-set used in this paper. Section 4 presents and discusses
the empirical results in four parts: first, an event study documents the negative announcement
effect and the subsequent recovery of stock prices. Second, a study of price pressure is presented.
Third, short selling is examined in detail, including a study showing how short selling relates to the
called convertible bond issue. Finally, the announcement effect is linked to hedging, short selling,
and the use of underwriters. A short summary and concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
2 Hedging convertible bond calls: Hypothesis development
2.1 Calls of convertible bonds
The owner of a convertible bond has an option to convert the bond into new common stock in
the firm. The option to convert is an American style option that matures at the same time as the
bond. Besides the conversion option, the majority of convertible bonds also gives the issuing firm
a call option, making it possible to redeem the bonds prematurely. The firm redeems the bonds
by sending a notice of redemption (the call announcement) to each bondholder. In the notice
of redemption, the firm offers to buy each bond for the call payment. The call payment (or the
effective call price) is the sum of the interest accrued since the last interest payment and the call
price specified in the bond indenture. The announcement of the call starts the conversion period
(or notice period) in which each bondholder still has the option to convert into stock. The notice
of redemption states the deadline for conversion as well as the call date (redemption date) when
unconverted bonds are redeemed and corresponding call payments are made.
2See Kraus and Stoll (1972), Harris and Gurel (1986), Shleifer (1986), Hansen (1988), and Kaul et al. (2000). A
recent paper documenting the existence of a temporary price pressure is D’Mello et al. (2003).
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The calls considered in this paper are conversion forcing (or in-the-money) calls. This means
that the conversion value, i.e. the value of the shares that would be received upon conversion, is
higher than the call payment at the time of the call. Therefore, if a bondholder has to choose
whether or not to convert on the day of the announcement, it is optimal to convert into stock.
Figure 1 presents a time-line for convertible bond calls. It also summarizes the trades of the
different players involved in convertible bond calls. These players and their trades are explained in
detail in the following subsection.
Announcement
date
Last conversion
date
Conversion period
(8-60 days)
time
Convertible bond funds:
Sell convertible bonds in anticipation of or at realized call
Convertible hedge desks:
Buy convertible bonds and hedge equity exposure by 
shorting stock
Underwriter:
Shorts
stock
Convert and close out the 
short positions
Buys convertible bonds, converts, 
and closes out the short positions
Call date
(0-11 days)Time-line:
Figure 1: Time-line and trades of the different players involved in convertible bond calls. The number of
days between the different dates have been taken from the sample of calls of convertible bonds described in
Subsection 3.2 and are stated in trading days.
2.2 Short selling and hedging
The original holders of convertible bonds such as convertible bond funds react to anticipated and
realized calls by selling their bonds. At least three factors may cause this selling behavior. First,
there are limits to the amount of equity risk these convertible bond funds are allowed to take.
Second, it may simply be that a call eliminates the characteristics of the convertible bond, such as
a conversion option with a long time to maturity, which caused the funds to buy the bonds in the
first place. Thereby, an anticipated or realized call often makes the bonds unattractive to these
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funds. Finally, the original holders may not want or are not allowed to hold the stock after the call
and therefore see no reason to deal with the practical matters related to the conversion itself.3
The buyers of convertible bonds are the convertible hedge desks of investment banks. Convert-
ible hedge desks hedge their equity exposure by shorting stock.4 Therefore, the number of shares
sold short is expected to increase in the period before and at the call announcement as the con-
vertible hedge desks buy bonds. Moreover, at the time of the call there will be an additional effect
on short selling since the hedge ratio for the convertible bonds already held by the desks increases.
This increase in the hedge ratio leads to an additional increase in the number of shares sold short
for hedging purposes.
Even after a convertible bond has been called, the conversion option is still valuable. As with
standard American call options, it is generally optimal to delay the conversion as long as possible,
i.e. until the end of the conversion period. Therefore, the number of shares sold short is expected to
remain high during the conversion period. Only later when the hedge desks find it optimal, do they
convert the bonds and use the shares received to close out their short positions. However, factors
such as dividend payments in the conversion period and the costs associated with maintaining the
hedging position can make it optimal to convert early. Consequently, these factors can lead to
conversions early in the conversion period, which, of course, influence the short selling pattern.
Underwriters of convertible bond calls also have an incentive to hedge their equity exposure.
An underwriter guarantees that the called bonds are converted into new stock in the firm. The
underwriter does this by paying the call payment to those bondholders who do not convert and
by buying the corresponding stock from the firm. As in the case of convertible hedge desks, the
underwriter can hedge the equity exposure by short selling stock which is then denoted as a lay-off
sale.5 The underwriters may, in contrast to the convertible hedge desks, have an incentive to buy
bonds during the conversion period and convert them into stock immediately. Such an incentive
exists if the underwriter wants to reduce the equity exposure as soon as possible. The incentive
to buy bonds in the market is even stronger when the underwriter is paid a take-up fee for each
3While it is not the purpose of this paper to explain the behavior of the original bondholders, the managers of
convertible bond funds and convertible hedge desks assured us that the original holders typically sell the bonds in
anticipation of or at realized calls. For example, the fraction of newly issued shares owned by the original bondholders
after conversion is estimated to be less than 20%.
4A similar investment strategy in the case of convertible preferred stocks is examined in Howe et al. (1998), where
evidence is provided that hedge desks buy the called convertible preferred stock and hedge the associated risk by
short selling the underlying stock.
5Underwritten calls of convertible bonds share similarities with underwritten rights offers. Singh (1997) examines
underwritten rights offers and finds that underwriters purchase rights hedged with the short sale of common stock in
the rights-offering period.
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bond they convert into stock. Furthermore, this is also consistent with the general perception in
the convertible bond market that underwriters are actively buying up bonds at prices higher than
what other market participants (hedge desks) are willing to pay.6 Finally, this also suggests two
reasons why underwritten calls might be associated with more hedging and thereby more short
selling than non-underwritten calls. First, the underwriter may be less diversified and have higher
risk exposure to the individual call, and, second, the underwriting fees may make higher hedging
costs acceptable to the underwriter.
Based on the above arguments we should expect that the number of shares sold short, and hence
also the number of shares traded (the trade volume), are related to the call. The number of shares
sold short is expected to increase in the period prior to the call with a peak at the announcement
of the call. In addition, the number of shares sold short is expected to decline at the end of the
conversion period when the new shares received upon conversion of the bonds are used to close out
the short positions. However, the decline in the number of shares sold short may happen before
the end of the conversion period if, for example, there are specific reasons for an early exercise of
the conversion option. The trade volume and the short selling of stock are examined in subsections
4.2 and 4.3.
An increase in the short selling of stock explains how the new shares issued upon a later
conversion can lead to price pressure at the announcement of the call. Therefore, part of the
announcement effect may be caused by investors who – for hedging purposes – short stock as
described above. The subsequent price recovery will then follow as the hedging positions are closed
out. Short selling leads to price pressure because the price must fall in order to induce investors to
absorb the increased supply of shares in accordance with the cost of liquidity. Short selling is often
argued to indicate a future excess demand for the stock as the short sellers have to buy shares in
the stock market in order to close out their short positions. However, this is not the case when
shares are sold short to hedge a convertible bond call. Instead, the short selling is accompanied
6An article dated April 29, 1996 in the Investment Dealers’ Digest describes this type of behavior in the case of
an underwritten call of a $1 billion convertible bond issue made by AMR Corp. The call was underwritten by five
investment banks (CS First Boston, Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan, Salomon Brothers, and Goldman, Sachs & Co.) As
underwriters, these investment banks had agreed to buy up to 12.9 million shares if the investors did not convert,
eliminating any need for AMR Corp. to come up with cash should the conversion fail. This call is argued to have a
high-risk profile not only because of the size of the call, but also because the conversion value is just 12.7% above the
call payment. As the article mentions: “It’s one of those deals where the firm’s relationship guys are happy, but the
risk management side is not happy.” The announcement of the call led to a stock price decline of 6.0%, increasing
the risk of a failed forced conversion. However, it is also noted in the article that: “... the underwriters themselves
were causing some of the pressure on the stock, as they aggressively reduced their risk by buying bonds and shorting
the stock in the open market. According to one source, only $400 million of the risk remained two days after the call
announcement.” The open market operations both reduced the underwriters’ risks and allowed them to receive the
take-up fee.
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by an expected future increase in the supply. Subsection 4.4 examines the relation between the
announcement effect and the short selling of stock.
As previously discussed, short selling is important in connection with convertible bond calls.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule §240.3b-3 defines a ‘short sale’ as, “any sale
of a security which the seller does not own.” A holder of a convertible bond is deemed to own the
corresponding shares only when the convertible bond has been handed in for conversion. Therefore,
it is a short sale if the owner of a convertible bond sells some of the corresponding shares before
the bond has been handed in for conversion.
Short sales are regulated in SEC Rule §§240.10a-1 and 240.10a-2. From §240.10a-1(a) it follows
that short sales are prohibited when stock prices are declining according to the so-called up-tick
rule. More precisely, the up-tick rule states that short sales are only permitted at a higher price
than the preceding transaction of the same stock (an up-tick) or at the same price as the previous
transaction, but at a higher price than the last difference price (a zero-plus-tick). However, there
are important exemptions from this rule. SEC Rule §240.10a-1(e) states that the up-tick rule does
not apply (i.e. you can short sell exempt from the up-tick rule) if you either own a convertible
bond or if you are making a lay-off sale in connection with a standby underwriting commitment.
This means that even though stock prices are declining, it is possible for convertible hedge desks,
who own convertible bonds, and for underwriters to short sell the corresponding stock. These two
exemptions from the up-tick rule are clearly important in the case of convertible bond calls because
the call announcement is, on average, associated with declining stock prices, as shown below.
3 Methodology and data
3.1 The methodology
A standard event study is used to derive the pattern of abnormal stock returns in a period around
the call announcement.7 An estimation period from 150 to 300 days after the announcement is used
in order to avoid the selection bias caused by the use of a pre-event estimation period.8 This period
is used to estimate the normal return parameters according to the market model with the CRSP
7The event study used is as described in Campbell et al. (1997), but some of the tests used in this paper are different
from the tests described there as we would like to test for the significance of abnormal returns over conversion periods
with different lengths. A test taking this into account is described, for example, in Mikkelson and Partch (1988).
8Because convertible bonds are typically issued with a conversion option deep out-of-the-money, stock prices
should increase before it is possible for the firm to force conversion by calling the bond. Hence, the use of a pre-event
estimation period biases the so-called normal returns used in the event study and therefore, a post-event estimation
window should be used.
7
equally weighted index as the market index. The event study has also been performed using other
methods to calculate the excess returns with other estimation periods, with the constant return
model, and with the value-weighted index as market index. In all cases the results are similar to
the main findings in the next section as long as a post-event estimation period is used.
3.2 The data-set of convertible bond calls
The data-set consists of complete calls of convertible bonds in the period 1963-1995. Standard and
Poor’s Bond Guide and Moody’s Bond Guide have been used to identify the calls.9 From this set
of calls, those fulfilling the following selection criteria were selected:
• An announcement date can be identified in either the Wall Street Journal or through the
Lexis-Nexis/Dow Jones news wires.10
• Information about the firm’s stock is available on the CRSP-file.
• The conversion value is higher than the call payment at the time of the announcement.11
These selection criteria lead to a sample of 380 calls distributed over time as Table 1 illustrates.
Though there are relatively few observations in the beginning of the time period, there is no severe
clustering of observations. Furthermore, as we are interested in how stock prices are affected by
the call, it is necessary to exclude observations where other news is announced at the time of the
call. Finally, in order to apply the event study, stock returns have to exist for a period around
the call announcement and during the estimation period. Therefore, in connection with the event
study we furthermore require that:
• No other news about the same firm appears in the Wall Street Journal from one day before
to one day after the announcement date.
• Daily stock returns are available on the CRSP-file from 50 days before the call to 300 days
after the call.
9An initial set of calls was kindly provided by W. T. Moore.
10An extensive news wire search has two advantages. First, it is possible to obtain a much larger sample than
those used in other studies of convertible bond calls. Second, news wires make it possible to obtain more accurate
announcement dates, which are clearly important when studying the announcement effect. News about the call may
be available on news wires a few days before the announcement appears in the Wall Street Journal.
11The conversion value is calculated as the stock price two days prior to the announcement multiplied by the
conversion ratio (the number of shares each bond is convertible into). The call payment is the payment including the
accrued interest that is paid to investors who do not convert into stock.
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A total of 71 observations do not satisfy these two requirements, thus the event study only takes
the remaining 309 observations into consideration.12
Table 1: Distribution over time of the sample of 380 convertible bond calls.
Period 63-65 66-68 69-71 72-74 75-77 78-80 81-83 84-86 87-89 90-92 93-95
Calls 5 24 23 24 23 46 32 48 60 41 54
In addition to the announcement date, more detailed information about each individual con-
vertible bond issue is required. Several sources have been used to collect this information. Some
of these are Standard & Poor’s Bond Guide, Moody’s Bond Guide, Moody’s Industrials, the Wall
Street Journal, and the Corporate Financing Directory. All information on stock splits, number of
shares outstanding, stock prices, stock returns etc. was collected from the CRSP-file.
Summary statistics
Table 2 provides sample characteristics. From the table, we observe that convertible bond calls in
general lead to quite a significant increase in the number of shares outstanding with an average
increase of 12.3% and a median of 9.6%. However, the increase in the number of shares outstanding
varies from 0.03% to 49.60%. The table also shows that the conversion value varies from 1% to
406% above the call payment with an average of 47%. These summary statistics indicate that
so-called clean-up calls exist in the sample.13
The length of the conversion period is on average slightly longer than one calendar month,
corresponding to 23.5 trading days. The bonds are typically called many years before maturity, on
average more than 16 years. Finally, it should be noted that 115 of the 380 calls are underwritten,
corresponding to slightly more than 30%. All in all, the characteristics of the present data-set
are similar to characteristics reported for data-sets used in the previously mentioned studies of
convertible bond calls.
12Of the 71 observations, 21 have been removed because of missing data, primarily because the stocks were delisted
shortly after the call due to takeovers and acquisitions. Further investigation of these 71 observations shows that
their average stock price pattern is not materially different from the remaining 309 observations.
13Clean-up calls are calls with the purpose of redeeming a small issue in order to avoid servicing such a small
amount of outstanding debt. These calls typically only lead to a small increase in the number of shares outstanding
and can have a conversion option deep in-the-money. This is consistent with the fact that the minimum face value
of a called issue is only $147,000.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the 380 convertible bond calls in the period 1963-1995. The increase
in the number of shares (millions) is defined as the total number of new shares that would be issued upon
a full conversion of the bonds outstanding. The increase in number of shares (%) is obtained by dividing
the increase in number of shares (millions) with the number of shares outstanding before the call. The size
of a called issue is the face value of debt outstanding before the call. The conversion value/call payment
measures the extent to which the conversion option is in-the-money. The conversion value is calculated based
on the stock price two days prior to the announcement of the call. The length of the conversion period is
the number of trading days from the announcement of the call until the end of the conversion period. The
number of years to maturity is the number of years from the time of the call until the maturity of the bond.
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Increase in number of shares (millions) 2.23 1.27 0.01 20.80
Increase in number of shares (%) 12.32 9.61 0.03 49.60
Size of called issue ($ millions) 53.53 30.00 0.15 805.00
Conversion value/call payment 1.47 1.32 1.01 5.06
Length of conversion period (trading days) 23.52 22.00 8.00 60.00
Number of years to maturity 16.66 18.00 1.00 27.00
3.3 The short interest data
At a given point in time, the number of shares sold short, also called the short interest, is defined
as the number of shares that has been borrowed for short sales but not repaid at that time.
Unfortunately, the short interest numbers are available only on a monthly basis, and furthermore
they have only been available electronically for the last few years. The numbers for this study were
collected from Standard & Poor’s Daily Stock Price Record for the NYSE and AMEX. The Daily
Stock Price Record reports the short interest numbers for each individual stock on the respective
stock exchanges. The numbers are the same as those published monthly in the Wall Street Journal
and represent the total number of shares sold short on the last day of trade on or before the 15th
of the month. For this study it is important to know the exact date for which the short interest
is computed. This is required in order to determine whether additional short selling caused by the
call announcement is included in a certain short interest number or not.14
14Due to the settlement period, the exact calculation date for the short interest depends on the length of this
period. For example, if the report date (the 15th) in a standard month before June 1995 is a trading day, the short
interest will report the number of shares sold short and still not closed out when the stock exchange closes on the
8th. In addition to the complications related to the calculation date, the data from the Daily Stock Price Record
is troublesome to work with when collecting short interest numbers. When stock splits or stock dividends occur, it
is often necessary to recalculate several of the numbers manually. In addition, simple errors have sometimes been
made in either the order of the months or the order of the short interest numbers. In all cases, the numbers have
been compared across several books with overlapping time periods in order to ensure accuracy, while some have
furthermore been checked by comparing them to the numbers reported in the Wall Street Journal.
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The exact calculation day is found for all the individual short interest numbers and the time
series of short interest numbers for the individual stocks are defined such that SI
−1 is the last
short interest number before the announcement, whereas SI0 is the short interest number, if any,
reported between the announcement day and the last day in the conversion period.15 The first
short interest number after the last day in the conversion period is defined as SI+1.
Summary statistics for the short interest numbers are provided in Subsection 4.3, where the
short interest numbers are examined.
4 Evidence for a short selling induced price pressure
This section examines the data-set of convertible bond calls and the data-set of short interest
numbers described in the previous section. Subsection 4.1 provides evidence for the announcement
effect and the subsequent recovery of stock prices. Subsection 4.2 considers price pressure further
by examining the trade volume around the call announcement and the relation between the trade
volume and the number of new shares to be issued upon conversion. Subsection 4.3 examines the
short selling of stock around the call announcement. Subsection 4.4 ends the empirical investigation
by examining whether the announcement effect can be explained by short selling and other variables
expected to be relevant according to the hedging arguments given in Subsection 2.2.
4.1 The announcement effect and price recovery
The results from the event study are shown in Table 3. For different event time periods, the table
shows the cumulative average abnormal return, (CAR), and two different tests for CAR = 0 and
their corresponding p-values. The test-statistic Z is a parametric test whereas J is a non-parametric
sign-test. The announcement period is from day −1 to day 0, taking into account that many of
the announcements occurred one day before the news appeared in the Wall Street Journal.16
The results are illustrated in Figure 2. As expected Table 3 and Figure 2 both show that the
stocks have high abnormal returns in the period before the call as discussed in footnote 8. The call
announcement leads to a highly significant −1.75% abnormal return, but the stock prices recover
15For six of the calls, there was actually more than one short interest number in the conversion period. For these
calls, the first of them is used as SI0. One hundred calls did not have a short interest number reported in the
conversion period.
16For calls where the announcement is from the news wires, the announcement day is the day after the call appears
in the news wires in order to be consistent with the announcement dates from the Wall Street Journal. This also
solves the problem that these calls may be announced after the stock market has closed in which case a possible effect
would only appear the following day.
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Table 3: Results from the event study. Date 0 is the announcement date. The last day in the conversion
period is denoted by lcvd. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return for the different time periods.
Z is the corresponding test statistic for the significance of CAR and J is the sign-test for the significance of
CAR. The p-values are calculated based on the fact that both Z and J are asymptotic normally distributed.
Period (event days) CAR(%) Z p-value(%) J p-value(%)
−50:−2 8.64 8.54 < 0.01 7.90 < 0.01
−1:0 −1.75 −10.86 < 0.01 −8.93 < 0.01
+1:lcvd 2.24 2.99 0.28 3.13 0.18
lcvd+1:lcvd+50 2.03 1.76 7.77 1.31 19.07
−1:lcvd 0.49 −0.29 77.24 0.40 69.05
during the conversion period with an abnormal return of 2.24%, significant at the 1% level. This
gives an insignificant abnormal return of 0.49% in the period from 1 day before the announcement
to the end of the conversion period.17
−50 0 50 100
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Event−time (days)
Cu
m
ula
tiv
e 
av
er
ag
e 
ab
no
rm
al 
re
tu
rn
s(%
)
Figure 2: The time pattern in the cumulative average abnormal return (CAR) from the event study. To
estimate the normal returns, a standard market-model is used in a post-event estimation window. Day 0 is
the announcement day.
17It is not obvious during which time period prices are expected to recover given that the stock price pattern is
caused by price pressure. This is because the calls may differ regarding the liquidity of the underlying stock, the
length of the conversion period, and the amount of short selling that actually occur at the announcement of the call.
The conversion period is used here because the short positions are expected to be closed out with new stock issued
upon conversion of the bonds during this period.
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Figure 2 also gives rise to two additional observations. First, the pattern in abnormal returns
suggests the existence of some additional price pressure approximately 25 days after the announce-
ment, corresponding approximately to the end of the average conversion period. This may happen
in cases where the equity risk has not been hedged, and hence the shares issued are not used to
close out short positions, but rather represent an increase in supply at the end of the conversion
period.
The second observation concerns the small positive drift in the period up to 100 days after the
announcement. Such a positive drift may suggest the existence of a momentum effect consistent with
the fact that many stocks in the sample have significantly positive pre-event stock returns. However,
the evidence of a momentum effect is weak. First, based on Table 3 there is only weak evidence for
a positive cumulative average abnormal return in the 50-days period after the end of the conversion
period. For example, the average cumulative abnormal return is only significantly positive at the
8% level. Furthermore, only 54% of the 309 observations experience positive abnormal returns in
the period after the end of the conversion period, leading to an insignificant sign-test. Second,
as discussed, for example, by Fama (1998), care should be taken when using traditional event
studies to evaluate long-run stock effects. In the present case, the findings of an announcement
effect and a subsequent stock price recovery are very robust, whereas the long-run stock price
pattern is somewhat sensitive to changes in the methodology and the stock market index used.
Finally, additional investigation of this issue provides none or only very weak evidence that the
recovery can be explained by a momentum effect. In particular, the cumulative abnormal returns
for the conversion period are significantly related to the announcement effect and not to pre-event
abnormal returns. These results are consistent with findings in the existing literature – see Mazzeo
and Moore (1992), Ederington and Goh (2001), and Datta et al. (2003).
We can conclude that stock prices decline at the announcement of a call, but recover during
the conversion period.18 Thereby, the results confirm earlier research arguing that the short-run
pattern in stock prices is caused by price pressure.19 The rest of this section provides new evidence
of price pressure.
18Also of potential interest is the pattern in stock price volatility around the event. Based on unreported results,
there is no significant change in average volatility from the period before the call to the end of the conversion
period. However, the results suggest that average volatility increases in the period after the conversion period. Two
interesting explanations may be given for this change. First, it may be that firms primarily make convertible bond
calls in periods with low volatility in order to increase the likelihood of a successful conversion of the bonds into
stock. Second, it may be that the firm (or management) changes behavior after the convertible bond issue has been
converted to stocks.
19As the event study is based on daily data, it is possible that the stock price pattern is caused by bid-ask bounce.
In results available upon request, we examine this issue in detail using several other tests as well as other data (daily
mid-quotes and transactions data). These results confirm the results from the event study.
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4.2 Trade volume and price pressure
It is often argued that changes in the supply of stocks or the demand for stocks may lead to price
effects. In the case of convertible bonds, the new shares are not issued at the announcement of the
call. Even if the new shares are not issued at the announcement of the call, the shares can still
create price pressure at that time. This is, for example, the case when the holders of convertible
bonds hedge against increased equity risk by short selling.
Because the short sale of a share is registered as a trade, an increase in the daily trade volume
of the stock is expected around the time of the call announcement. This is examined in Figure 3,
which plots the average scaled daily trade volume against event-time.20 If an identical number of
shares were traded each day, this would give the solid horizontal line shown at 1 in the figure.
From Figure 3 it follows that there is a large increase in the number of shares traded during
the time around the call announcement date. The trade volume also appears to be higher than
normal in a short period after the announcement. This is consistent with the phenomenon that
in a short period after the call announcement investors are still selling convertible bonds to hedge
desks, leading to additional short selling and associated price pressure. Figure 2 also suggests the
existence of additional price pressure the first few days after the call announcement. In particular,
the cumulative average abnormal return for day +1 to +3 is −0.16%, and it is not until day +5
that stock prices reach a higher level than the level at day 0.
In Subsection 2.2 it is argued that the increase in short selling (and hence in trading) around the
time of the announcement is due to hedging by convertible hedge desks and a possible underwriter.
Therefore, we should expect a positive relationship between the trade volume at the time of the
call and the number of new shares that would be issued upon conversion of the bonds. As more
new shares are issued upon conversion, more shares must be sold in order to hedge the equity risk
of the convertible bonds. This relationship is examined by running a regression of the total trade
volume for day −1 and 0 (denoted TRV OLi) on a constant and the number of new shares to be
issued (denoted Newi), where both numbers of shares are relative to the total number of shares
outstanding (denoted SOi). With this notation, the regression can be written as
TRV OLi
SOi
= β0 + β1
Newi
SOi
+ i. (1)
20By scaled, we mean that before the average of the trade volumes is calculated, the trade volumes for the individual
stocks are divided by their average for the same period, thus preventing stocks with a very high daily trade volume
from being too influential. Scaling by the number of shares outstanding, for example, gives a similar figure.
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Figure 3: Average scaled daily trade volume with day 0 as the announcement day. The trade volumes for
the individual stocks are divided by their mean for the same period. The horizontal line at 1 shows the
mean of the average scaled daily trade volumes and illustrates how the pattern would have been if the same
number of shares were traded every day. The dashed lines give the one-standard deviation band around the
mean.
The results of the regression are (using White’s (1980) heteroscedastic consistent errors):
βˆ0 = 0.0068
(0.0011)
βˆ1 = 0.0511
(0.0114)
t = 6.0, p < 0.1% t = 4.5, p < 0.1%
Adj.R2 = 12%.
The regression results provide strong evidence for the expected positive relation. On average,
the number of shares traded at the call announcement corresponds to more than 5% of the new
shares to be issued. This is consistent with the conjecture that the hedging of equity risk associated
with the convertible bond calls causes the trade.
So far, this section has provided evidence for a price recovery as well as evidence that the pat-
tern in stock prices is due to price pressure caused by the call. However, we still need to examine
more closely whether the increase in trade volume can be explained by investors’ hedging the risk
associated with the called convertible bond. Therefore, the next subsection examines whether there
is a time pattern in the number of shares sold short and whether the short selling is directly related
to the call.
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4.3 The short interest
Subsection 2.2 described how short selling is expected to be related to convertible bond calls.
First, we should expect that the short selling of stock is related to the call announcement and the
importance of hedging. Second, short selling is also expected for calls that are not underwritten.
Third, the amount of short selling is expected to be positively related to the size of the call.
Finally, we should expect that the announcement effect is related to the amount of short selling.
This subsection will examine the first three of these relationships by looking at the monthly short
interest numbers. The next subsection examines the relationship between short selling and the
announcement effect.
In the previous section, the short interest associated with the call was argued to be SI0. How-
ever, due to the data available there might be some problems in connection with SI0 as a measure of
the short selling caused by the call. First, with monthly data and many conversion periods shorter
than one month, there are one hundred calls for which no short interest number is available from
the conversion period. Therefore, we have chosen to define the short interest SIat call associated
with the call announcement as SI0 when SI0 is available and SI−1 when it is not. Second, as
described above, the calculation date for SI0 may be close to the end of the conversion period.
Finally, as described in Subsection 2.2 there may be reasons for an early close-out of the short
positions, which also makes it difficult to measure the additional short selling that occurred at the
time of the call. This means that even in the cases where SI0 is available, it may be an inadequate
measure of the short selling associated with the call.21
Table 4 presents summary statistics on the relative sizes of the short interest numbers. Panel A
lists the short interest three months before the call (SI
−3), the short interest associated with the
call (SIat call), and the first short interest number from after the last conversion day (SI+1) for the
whole sample. Panel B focuses on the change in short selling from just before the call (SI
−1) to
a point within the conversion period (SI0) for the sample divided into three groups dependent on
this change as well as the availability of SI0. In the first three rows of Panel A, the short interest
numbers are divided by the number of shares outstanding before the call. In the last three rows
of Panel A and in the rows of Panel B, they are divided by the number of new shares to be issued
21The problems involved with SIat call suggest using max[SI−1, SI0] instead as the short interest associated with
the call. All of the following analyses of short selling have been done using this measure. This change of measure did
not alter any of the main conclusions, but did improve the level of significance of some of the results.
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upon conversion.22
From Panel A of Table 4 it follows that the short interest around the call is on average 2.8% of
the total number of shares outstanding and 21.8% of the new shares to be issued. The amount of
short selling varies both relative to the number of shares outstanding and relative to the number
of new shares to be issued upon conversion. In both cases, the minimum corresponds to the case
where there is no short selling at all. Relative to the number of shares outstanding, the maximum
short selling is approximately 30%, while it is approximately 80% of the number of new shares.
The maximum values illustrate that for some calls it is possible that the number of shares sold
short stays at a high level even after the conversion period. This indicates that there are probably
calls where the short selling of stock is not due to the call alone. Another explanation for short
selling around convertible bond calls is that sometimes a call is triggered by a possible merger or
acquisition and that some short sellers are speculating in the outcome of such corporate events.
Panel B of Table 4 suggests some interesting differences between the three groups examined.
First, the level of short selling is lower for the group that experiences an increased SI0 compared to
the two other groups. However, the group shows a quite steep increase in short selling, and during
the conversion period the average short selling corresponds to more than 22% of the new shares
to be issued. Second, for the group with a decreased SI0 there is still quite a significant drop in
short interest from SI0 to SI+1. This suggests that even though there seems to be measurement
problems or reasons for converting early, average short selling during the conversion period still
involves more than 15% of the new shares to be issued. Finally, it is worth noting that large calls
are more frequent in the group with an increase in short selling than in the two other groups. We
will return to several of these differences later and show that they, at least partly, are related to
the incentives to hedge.
All in all, Table 4 indicates that the pattern in the short interest numbers is related to the call.
There is an increase in short selling before the call and a large decline after the conversion period.
As the decline in the short interest is so pronounced from around the call to the subsequent month,
the short selling seems primarily associated with the call itself and not with other corporate events.
The following will examine this time pattern in further detail.
22When dividing by the number of new shares, we restrict the analysis to the calls that lead to an increase of at
least 2.5% in the number of shares outstanding, i.e. we exclude clean-up calls. This avoids the problem that might
exist when the short interest is divided by a small number of new shares to be issued. One example is a call that
leads to only 19.000 new shares being issued. For this call, the short interest is around 2 million shares corresponding
to more than one hundred times the number of new shares to be issued. In addition, the pattern in the short interest
for this firm seems completely unaffected by the call.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the short interest data for the 380 convertible bond calls in the period
1963-1995 and the corresponding tests for changes in the short interest around the calls. The first three
rows in Panel A measure the short interest relative to the total number of shares outstanding, SO, while
the last three rows in Panel A and the rows in Panel B measure the short interest relative to the number
of new shares, New, to be issued upon a full conversion of the bonds. The t-tests in Panel A test if there
is a difference between the short selling at the time of the call (SIat call) and the short selling in month −3
(SI−3) and in month +1 (SI+1) respectively. The t-test is the standard one-sided test for the difference
between means using matched pairs. In order to avoid scaling problems when dealing with the low number
of new shares arising from small calls, it is necessary to set a minimum increase of 2.5% in the number of
shares outstanding when dividing by the number of new shares to be issued. This reduces the number of
calls to 327. Panel B, which shows the mean and median short interest for these 327 observations, is divided
into three groups: 1) Increased SI0 includes observations with an increase from SI−1 to SI0, 2) Decreased
SI0 includes observations with a decrease from SI−1 to SI0, and 3) No SI0 includes observations without a
short interest number for month 0. The numbers of observations in the three groups are 131, 110 and 86.
Panel A
Mean (%) Median (%) Min. (%) Max. (%) t-test p-value (%)
SI
−3
SO
2.13 1.06 0.00 30.30 1.61 5.41
SIat call
SO
2.80 1.34 0.00 33.01
SI+1
SO
1.05 0.43 0.00 10.86 −10.31 < 0.01
SI
−3
New
15.94 9.29 0.00 77.45 2.71 0.35
SIat call
New
21.80 12.97 0.00 89.81
SI+1
New
7.88 3.90 0.00 63.34 18.60 < 0.01
Panel B
Increased SI0 Decreased SI0 No SI0
Mean (%) Median (%) Mean (%) Median (%) Mean (%) Median (%)
SI
−3
New
12.60 6.98 17.39 10.71 17.60 9.75
SI
−1
New
15.83 7.75 22.37 17.23 23.55 13.66
SI0
New
22.75 12.69 15.59 10.94 – –
SI+1
New
7.69 3.45 7.55 4.28 8.18 2.51
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From Section 2, it follows that several characteristics of the call are expected to influence the
bondholders’ conversion behavior and hence also the short selling of stock. One main characteristic
is related to the conversion option. The incentive to delay conversion and hedge the equity risk is
expected to be positively related to the relative importance of the conversion option’s time value.
To examine this relation and the time pattern in short selling, the data-set is divided into four
groups. Group 1 includes the 25% of the data-set with the highest time-value of the conversion
option (calculated using Black and Scholes’ (1973) formula) divided by the conversion value; Group
2 includes the next 25%, and so forth. For each of these groups, Figure 4 plots the time pattern of
the short interest.
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Figure 4: The average scaled short interest for the data-set divided into four groups dependent on the
conversion option’s time value relative to the conversion value. The time value of the option is calculated
using Black and Scholes’ (1973) formula. Group 1 has the highest value, while Group 4 has the lowest
relative time value. The short interest numbers are divided by the number of new shares to be issued from
conversion and therefore, it is again required that New
SO
> 2.5%.
Figure 4 confirms that the pattern in the short interest numbers is related to the call. In
addition, the figure reveals some differences in the time pattern of short interest between the
groups. Especially Group 1 stands out with a lower level of short selling in the period before
the call. This suggests that calls in this group are less anticipated or that the conversion options
have only recently become in-the-money. Furthermore, the four groups are seen to differ with
respect to the change in the short interest from month −1 to 0. As described in Subsection 2.2,
we should in general expect an increase in short selling from month −1 to month 0. The reason
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is that the holder of a called convertible bond is expected to delay the conversion until the end
of the conversion period. Such a delay in conversion implies that the hedging positions should be
maintained until the end of the conversion period, and the increase in short selling associated with
the announcement of the call should be seen as an increase from SI
−1 to SI0. Group 1 shows such
a clear increase. This is as expected because a conversion option with a relatively high time value
should make short selling more pronounced and persistent, and therefore it is more likely that SI0
will capture an increase in the short selling at the announcement of the call. These results are also
consistent with the results from Table 4, Panel B, in the sense that the group with increased SI0
primarily consists of observations with a relatively high time value of the conversion option.
For the other groups in Figure 4, there is actually a decrease in short selling from month −1
to month 0 –, the decrease being most pronounced for Groups 3 and 4. There may be several
reasons why the pattern for these groups is not completely as expected. As mentioned above, one
problem is that SI0 can be an inadequate measure of the increase in short selling caused by the
call, for example, if there are reasons to convert early. Another problem is that the calculation of
the average of the short interest numbers for month 0 is based on fewer observations than the other
months. This is especially a problem because, as shown in Table 4, Panel B, the group missing SI0
has a relatively high level of short selling before the call.
Table 5 presents a more detailed examination of the changes in the short interest from Figure 4.
For the calls with a short interest number for month 0, the table presents the number of calls with
SI0 > SI−1 and the number of calls with SI0 > SI+1 for the four groups and the total sample.
The table confirms the pattern in Figure 4. Only Group 1 has a significant increase in the short
interest number from month −1 to month 0. However, for the other groups, approximately half of
the short interest numbers are seen to increase even though Figure 4 indicates a large decline from
month −1 to month 0. The decline in short selling from month 0 to month +1 is clear and highly
significant for all groups. If, due to measurement problems, the large decline observed between SI0
and SI+1 for some calls occurs between SI−1 and SI0, then this is a possible explanation for the
overall decline in the average for three of the four groups in Figure 4.
These results provide strong evidence that the time pattern in the short selling of stock is
related to the call and that anticipated or realized calls lead to an increase in the number of shares
sold short. Furthermore, after the end of the conversion period there is a large decrease in short
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Table 5: Comparison of the short interest around the calls for the total data-set and for the data-set divided
into four groups dependent on relative importance of the conversion option as measured by the conversion
option’s time value (calculated using the Black and Scholes’ (1973) formula) divided by the conversion value.
Group 1 has the highest relative time value, while Group 4 has the lowest relative time value of the conversion
option. Calls without any short interest for month 0 are excluded. #Obs refers to the number of observations
in the different groups. Bin-prob is the probability of drawing at least the observed number of increases
under the binomial distribution with probability 0.5 and #Obs trials.
Group (#Obs) #SI0 > SI−1 Bin-prob #SI0 > SI+1 Bin-prob
1 (70) 49 < 0.1% 64 < 0.1%
2 (70) 38 37.5% 64 < 0.1%
3 (70) 26 98.9% 63 < 0.1%
4 (70) 28 96.4% 50 < 0.1%
All (280) 141 47.6% 241 < 0.1%
selling.23 This evidence not only supports the hedging-induced price pressure explanation given in
this paper, but also provides new and strong evidence against the bad-news explanation, adding to
the evidence presented in, for example, Ederington and Goh (2001). If a convertible bond call was
viewed as bad news about the firm, we should have expected a more permanent increase in short
selling after the call rather than the observed decrease.
In general, an underwriter will not be appointed until just before the call, and hence, is expected
to short sell in only a relatively short period around the call. Therefore, the time pattern indicates
that short selling is not alone caused by an underwriter.24 To examine this further, we have per-
formed several tests for the relationship between short selling and whether the call is underwritten
or not. None of these tests provided any evidence for a significant relationship between the amount
of short selling and underwriting. These results are consistent with the argument that convertible
hedge desks are also short selling stock in connection with convertible bond calls.
Having demonstrated that the time pattern in short selling is related to the call, we will now
23Here it can be noted that stock options provide an alternative means by which equity exposure can be hedged.
Slightly more than 10% of the sample of calling firms have stock options traded. The trade volume of these options
has been examined using options data from the CBOE. Interestingly, the pattern in trade volume for this small
sample of firms is quite consistent with the time pattern in the short selling of stock. The trade volume increases
during the period before the call announcement and decreases during the conversion period. Furthermore, there is
some evidence of abnormal trading volume on the announcement date and the subsequent days.
24This is important because Singh et al. (1991) show that the negative announcement effect is most pronounced
for underwritten calls. Thus, one explanation consistent with this finding could be that only underwriters are short
selling.
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examine whether the number of shares sold short is related to the called bond. First of all, we
should expect a positive relationship between the short interest and the size of the call. The size of
the call is again measured by the number of new shares that would be issued if all bonds outstanding
were converted. SIat call is again used as the short interest number for the call. However, as we are
only interested in the increase in the short interest caused by the call, the short interest in month
+1 is subtracted. This is done under the assumption that the short interest number in month
+1 represents the normal level due to other reasons for short selling.25 In order to examine the
relationship between the short interest and the number of new shares to be issued, the following
regression is run:
(SIat call − SI+1)i
SOi
= β0 + β1
Newi
SOi
+ i, (2)
where SOi and Newi are as defined earlier. The results of the regression are (using White’s (1980)
heteroscedastic consistent errors):
βˆ0 = −0.0019
(0.0023)
βˆ1 = 0.1918
(0.0264)
t = −0.59, p = 55% t = 6.92, p < 0.1%
Adj.R2 = 26%.
These results show a highly significant positive relationship between the short interest at the
time of the call and the new shares to be issued. From the regression, we obtain the interesting
result that the total number of shares sold short on average corresponds to at least 19% of the new
shares.26
The above has provided evidence for a significant positive relationship between trade volume
around the call and the new shares to be issued (regression (1)) and between short selling in
connection with the call and the new shares to be issued (regression (2)). Hence, indirectly this
also provides evidence for a positive relationship between trade volume around the call and short
25To avoid a possible effect from both the short interest and the number of new shares to be issued being positively
related to the number of shares outstanding, we again divide by the number of shares outstanding before the call.
Similar results are obtained if SI+1 is not subtracted, or if we do not divide by the number of shares outstanding.
26A closer look at the data also reveals a large cross sectional variation in the amount of short selling, as also
suggested by Table 4. This may be caused by several factors. First, the monthly data on the short interest do not
perfectly measure the short interest associated with the call. Second, for calls with a high fraction of new shares
relative to the shares outstanding, it may be difficult to borrow the shares required in order to short sell. Thus, for
large calls, there may not be as much short selling as expected. Finally, it may of course be the case that not all
convertible bondholders react to a call as explained in this paper. There may, for example, be convertible bond issues
where the original bondholders do not sell the convertible bonds when the call is announced, but instead keep the
new shares received from the conversion. There may also be private placements where the convertible bonds are not
traded and hence, should not be expected to have the same pattern in short selling for these calls.
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selling in connection with the call. For a more direct test of the relationship, we run a regression of
trade volume around the call on the change in short selling from month −1 to month 0, both divided
by the number of shares outstanding. Running this regression, including all 280 observations with
a short interest number for month 0, provides no evidence for a significant relationship between the
two. However, if the regression is restricted to include only the 141 observations with an increase
from month −1 to 0, the relationship is positive and significant at the 10% level.
4.4 Hedging and the announcement effect
So far, evidence has been provided for a negative announcement effect, a subsequent price recovery,
and for a relationship between short selling and the call. A final step is to examine whether the
announcement effect can be explained by hedging. One issue to examine is the relation between
the announcement effect and the increase in short selling. However, we again encounter problems
with availability as well as measurement errors with regard to short interest numbers for month
0.27 In an attempt to avoid these problems, we can instead use SI
−1 as a measure of the short
selling that has occurred already before the announcement. In this case, a positive relation between
the announcement effect and SI
−1 should be expected. This is because a lot of short selling before
the call implies only little additional short selling at the announcement and hence a less negative
announcement effect. One case where SI
−1 is expected to be high is when the call is anticipated by
the market. The reason is that the increased equity risk of the convertible bond would then lead
to additional short selling already before the call.
If, as argued in the previous sections, the announcement effect is due to hedging-induced price
pressure, it should be expected that several other variables may help explain the cross sectional
variation in the announcement effect. First, a large fraction of the new shares to be issued upon
conversion relative to the number of shares outstanding is expected to be associated with more price
pressure and hence with a more negative announcement effect. This predicts a negative relationship
between the announcement effect and the size of the call. Second, in the case of underwritten calls,
hedging performed by the underwriter as described in Section 2.2 may lead to additional price
27As a proxy for an increase in the short interest at the call announcement, we could instead use SI0 − SI−1
for the calls where SI0 exists. A cross plot of the announcement effect, CAR−1:0, against the increase in short
interest calculated as
SI0−SI−1
SO
provides only weak evidence for a relation between the short interest pattern and the
announcement effect. There is only evidence for the expected negative relation between the announcement effect and
the increase in the short interest for calls with an increase in the short interest number from month −1 to month 0.
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pressure, which due to measurement problems may not be captured by the short selling measure.
This predicts a negative relationship between the announcement effect and a dummy variable, which
is 1 for underwritten calls and 0 otherwise. Third, as examined in Subsection 4.3, there are the
three variables used to calculate the time value of the conversion option. These three factors are the
extent to which the conversion option is in-the-money, the volatility of the underlying stock, and
the length of the conversion period. If the conversion option is deep in-the-money, the incentive to
hedge may be weak. Therefore, a positive relationship is expected between the announcement effect
and a measure of the conversion value relative to the call payment. Similarly, a higher volatility or
a longer conversion period may increase the incentive to hedge. Therefore, the announcement effect
is expected to be negatively related to the volatility and to the length of the conversion period.28
In order to examine the relation between the announcement effect and the variables described,
the following cross sectional regression is run:
CARi,−1:0 = β0 + β1
(SI
−1)i
Newi
+ β2
Newi
SOi
+ β3Ui + β4
CVi − CPi
CPi
+ β5σˆi + β6Lengthi + i, (3)
where Ui is an underwriting dummy, which is 1 if the call is underwritten and 0 otherwise. CVi is
the conversion value, CPi is the call payment, σˆi is the volatility of stock prices for bond i estimated
in the conversion period, and Lengthi is the length of the conversion period in years for bond i. As
before, only observations with New
SO
> 2.5% are used in the regression in order to focus on the signif-
icant calls. Results from the individual regressions and the joint regression in (3) are given in Table
6, where the joint regression only includes variables that are significant in the individual regressions.
From rows 1–6 in Table 6 it follows that except for the insignificant length of the conversion
period, the signs on the estimated coefficients are all as predicted by the hypothesis that the
announcement effect is caused by a hedging-induced price pressure. The short selling variable
(β1), calculated from the monthly data, is significantly positive with a p-value of 1.1%, meaning as
expected that additional short selling before the call leads to a less negative announcement effect.
The size of the call (β2), the underwriting dummy (β3), and the degree in-the-money (β4) are all
also significant with p-values less than 5%. Surprisingly, the volatility (β5) and the length of the
conversion period (β6) turn out to be insignificant. Row 7 covers a joint regression, including the
28The volatility of stock prices estimated in the conversion period has been used as the volatility of stock prices.
However, the results are qualitatively the same if, for example, the stock price volatility estimated before the call was
used instead.
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Table 6: Results from the regression given in equation (3). Short selling before call refers to SI−1
New
, Size of
call is New
SO
, Underwritten is a dummy which is 1 for underwritten calls and 0 otherwise, Degree in-the-money
denotes CV−CP
CP
, Volatility is σˆ, Length conv.period is the length of the conversion period in years. SI−1 is
the short interest number from the month before the announcement, New is the number of new shares to
be issued upon conversion, SO is the number of shares outstanding before the announcement, CV is the
conversion value, and CP is the call payment. σˆ is the volatility of stock prices in the conversion period.
The numbers in parenthesis are White’s (1980) heteroscedastic consistent errors. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in the standard test for significance of the estimated
coefficients. Only observations with New
SO
> 2.5% are used.
Intercept Short selling Size of Under- Degree Volatility Length
Row
(Adj.R2)
before call call written in-the-money conv.period
βˆ0 βˆ1 βˆ2 βˆ3 βˆ4 βˆ5 βˆ6
1
(1.7%)
−0.0220
(0.0024)
∗∗∗ 0.0210
(0.0081)
∗∗ — — — — —
2
(4.8%)
−0.0114
(0.0035)
∗∗∗ — −0.0478
(0.0159)
∗∗∗ — — — —
3
(2.0%)
−0.0149
(0.0023)
∗∗∗ — — −0.0086
(0.0038)
∗∗ — — —
4
(2.6%)
−0.0224
(0.0025)
∗∗∗ — — — 0.0106
(0.0049)
∗∗ — —
5
(1.4%)
−0.0113
(0.0053)
∗∗ — — — — −0.0155
(0.0145)
—
6
(0.6%)
−0.0235
(0.0051)
∗∗∗ — — — — — 0.0421
(0.0655)
7
(4.6%)
−0.0155
(0.0067)
∗∗ — — — 0.0139
(0.0045)
∗∗∗ −0.0270
(0.0156)
∗ −0.0138
(0.0673)
8
(3.1%)
−0.0189
(0.0028)
∗∗∗ 0.0197
(0.0079)
∗∗ — −0.0081
(0.0040)
∗∗ — — —
9
(8.4%)
−0.0177
(0.0054)
∗∗∗ 0.0177
(0.0077)
∗∗ −0.0421
(0.0170)
∗∗ −0.0047
(0.0038)
0.0088
(0.0046)
∗ — —
degree in-the-money (β4), volatility (β5), and the length of the conversion period (β6). In this
regression all variables enter with the expected sign and furthermore, the volatility is significant
at the 10% level. Row 8 documents that short selling and the underwriting dummy are both
significant at the 5% level in a joint regression. Row 9 includes all variables that are significant in
the individual regressions. Short selling and size are still significant at the 5% level, whereas the
p-value for the degree in-the-money of the conversion option and the underwriting dummy has now
increased to 5.9% and 22.0% respectively. If the volatility and the length of the conversion period
are included in the joint regression, they enter insignificantly without changing the conclusions
following from row 9.
The changes in the level of significance for some of the variables between the individual regres-
sions and the joint regression indicate the existence of multicollinearity in the regression. From
regression (2), we already know that there is a positive and significant relationship between short
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selling and the size of the call. Similarly, it turns out that there are several interesting and important
correlations between the other variables. For example, underwriting and the degree in-the-money
are negatively correlated, while underwriting and the size of the call are positively correlated. The
degree in-the-money is positively correlated with stock price volatility and the length of the con-
version period, which provides an explanation for the results about the volatility and the length
of the conversion period in the regression. A higher volatility or longer conversion period is asso-
ciated with a deeper in-the-money conversion option. Therefore, the effect on hedging of a higher
volatility or a longer conversion period is partly offset by the effect of the conversion option being
deeper in-the-money.
All these relationships and the results from the regression provide additional evidence for the
importance of risk and hedging in connection with convertible bond calls. In particular, short selling
and other variables related to hedging are, at least in part, able to explain the announcement effect.
5 Summary and conclusions
Convertible bond calls are associated with a negative announcement effect and a subsequent price
recovery. In order to explain this stock price pattern this paper has considered the behavior of
investment banks around the call. Evidence was provided that convertible hedge desks and a
possible underwriter short sell stock at the time of the call as a means of hedging the equity risk
associated with the convertible bond.
One major insight of the paper is that the pattern in the number of shares sold short is related
to the called convertible bond issue. Furthermore, it was shown that the short selling of stock, at
least in part, can explain the pattern in stock prices around the call consistent with a hedging-
induced price pressure. For example, the announcement effect was linked to the short selling of
stock, to whether the call is underwritten or not, to the size of the call, and to the extent to which
the conversion option is in-the-money.
The assertion of hedging by investment banks and the related empirical evidence are important
for at least three reasons. First, the results close a gap in the existing literature on convertible bond
calls, this paper being the first to explain and provide evidence that short selling translates the later
increase in the supply of shares into price pressure at the time of the announcement. Second, the
discovery of a short-selling induced price pressure provides additional evidence for the importance
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of liquidity costs. Finally, the results provide new insights into the investment strategies of highly
specialized investment banks and how these investment strategies have consequences for the stock
price pattern around convertible bond calls.
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